THE BOOK OF HOS EA
AS VISIONARY PROPHECY:
A S EARCH FOR GENRE

. ..

LAURA BARGE

As a literary critic presuming to write about the book of Hosea as an example of
the prophetic Scriptures of the Hebrew Bible and the Christian Old Testament, I
am constrained to begin with a definition of my critical approach. Unfashionably, I
do not read the texts under consideration using postmodem literary theories such
as deconstruction, reader response, or exploration of cultural determinism. I Instead,
I find much more useful an approach that is best described in literary terms as a
blend of the earlier theories of the New Criticism and structuralism. In fact, the
very concept of literary genre rests on elements that the earlier approaches, in contrast to the later, value in texts, elements such as unity, coherence, unique style,
and specific modes of thematic expression.
As an amateur in biblical studies, I work convinced that scholars such as
Brevard Childs and James Sanders are on target in their insistence that interpretation proceed from a canonical concept of the Old Testament. Such interpretation
interacts with a text as it presently exists rather than as a collage of various stages
through history of disparate composition. Recognition of a canonical whole does
not trivialize a study of the multiple historical processes and stages by which a
prophetic text has arrived at its present form, but it does insist that the canonical
form is the final Scripture to be interpreted as the record reflecting the "history of
encounter between God and Israel."2
The question of the authorial intentionality of such a view of the prophetic writings cannot be ignored. Who or what is ultimately responsible for the multiple
authorial processes resulting in a canonical text? Childs recognizes a "major literary
and theological force" in the shaping of the "present form of the Hebrew Bible."3
From original recorded oral fragments through the revisions of tradents to the emergence of texts as sacred canon, the message of the prophets is a "theocentric word"
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proceeding from a "divine source" that has ordered the stages of the composition of the
received text. 4
Another question that must be addressed in advance of any study such as this one is
the existence of the prophetic writings as both the Hebrew Scriptures of Judaism and the
Old Testament of Christianity. It is true that the writings differ in regard to text, scope,
and order and that numerous complex claims have been put forth for both the continuity
and discontinuity of the two versions. s Within the boundaries of my work here, however,
we need note only two basic facts that can hardly be disputed. The New Testament writers' use of the Hebrew canon does not demonstrate rejection or alteration but rather a
new interpretation of these Scriptures grounded on the New Testament's claims about
Jesus Christ. Furthermore, these Christian claims are dependent upon both the Christian
and Jewish Scriptures as the sacred canon that is the record of God's revelation of truth to
Israel, the church, and the world 6

I. THE PROBlEM OF GENRE
My interest in the genre of the Old Testament books of prophecy emerged in my
teaching of university courses on the Bible as literature. As I led students through the variety of genres that make up the Bible and arrived at the Old Testament books of prophecy- Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and the twelve minor prophets, Hosea through Malachi- I
made the discovery that the students were dissatisfied with both my classroom presentation of these books and with the published critical commentary about them. I have come
to understand their discontent. In standard works on the literary genres of the Bible, substantive content on the books of prophecy is scattered and fragmentary. In fact, critics
such as Northrop Fyre, Robert Alter, Tremper Longman, and Leland Ryken acknowledge
that offered treatments of the prophets are incomplete and less than satisfactory. Consider
the following introduction with which Ryken prefaces his application of the stylistic category of satire to the book of Amos:
The part of the Bible that gives literary critics most difficulty is the prophetic books.
The reasons are multiple .. . . prophecy in the biblical sense is not a common genre
at large. When judged by classical standards of unity, moreover, prophecy is too
miscellaneous in structure and content to seem manageable. Literary critics look in
vain for the superstructure that will provide a unifying impression of a prophetic
book of the Bible. . . . [A critical suggestion] finally emerges as too amorphous to
impose a firm unity on the prophetic book. 7
What are some reasons or difficulties that have prevented critics from defining such a
superstructure, a particular literary genre that can be applied to this collection of books as
a whole? One reason is that we must be careful not to join what Kugel somewhat mockingly calls the "Task Force on Genre.'" Modem categories of genre are just that, conventional categories that are neither "timeless" nor "ultimate." A responsible critic does not
impose modem conventions that are "foreign" to the givens of the Bible's linguistic/ historical origins.8 Perhaps there is no modem generic term that can serve as an umbrella for
this group of writings.
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An initial difficulty is that the differentiation between prose and poetry-a distinction
that is difficult to make in other types of biblical writings- is nowhere more problematic
than here. And even when a critic makes a beginning of useful distinctions, he faces the
daunting task of accounting for what Alter terms an unexplained and "uneven drift" in
the prophetic writings from strong poetry to weakened poetic forms to overt prose. 9 The
oracles of the book of Isaiah are in the linguistic shape of Hebrew poetry, but the lines on
the Scroll where they occur are in prose form.' o
A second difficulty is that the presently recognized generic term widely applied to this
collection of books- that of "oracle"-is inadequate from a literary approach. This application, initiated by historical form-critical research, assigns the genre of oracle only to separate
units in the prophetic books, claiming that the books as total entities are not "systematic
compositions" but collections of short speeches from the prophetic activities of Israel during
these centuries. To move beyond analysis and classification of these original speech units
becomes speculation." More recent form-critical efforts include study of redaction strategies that acknowledge the additions and changes made by editors other than the original
author that result in the final form of a book '2 Such efforts may move closer to the basic
premise of Tremper Longman's literary approach that "genre analysis is synchronic" and
thus "concerned to identify the type of literature [as it presently exists], not its prehistory"'3
and yet continue what is essentially analysis of separate segments of a text. Tucker can
agree that a "prophetic book itself is an appropriate unit for ... analysis, representing the
final stage in the development of the tradition and a quite distinct genre of literature with
certain typical features,"'· and yet continue to treat a prophetic writing as a collection of
"units ... whether large or small, 'original' or late .. . by means of form-critical analysis."'s
This complex and often frustrating identifying of types of oracles, although yielding
useful information about content, can demonstrate the law of diminishing returns in at
least three ways. Marvin Sweeney explains the first problem (read text as book in the following quotation) :

Genres [defined as these individual oracular units] can determine the overall form
of a distinct prophetic text, but they do not necessarily do so. Typical generic elements frequently function within a text and playa role in its composition or formulation, but they do not necessarily dictate its composition or formulation .... Each
text is unique even though it employs typical elements of genre. Genres do not
always define texts; they function within them as compositional tools. '6
A content primarily composed of short speech units is a common characteristic of
these books, but can we say that this characteristic is the "genre" that identifies the overarching literary structure of these books? As Tremper Longman insists, 'The literary
approach asks the question of the force of the whole."'7 A second problem is functional.
How many types of oracles are there, where do they differ and where overlap, and how
many pages of criticism would it take to squeeze the total content of these fifteen books
into these categories, categories that relentlessly slip and slide into multiplicity and division? Johannes Lindblom, the Swedish theologian who devoted forty years of his life to
studying the prophets, agrees with form criticism that the "primary form of a prophetic
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utterance was . .. the oracle." Lindblom describes the "original oracles" as "short, concise,
pregnant, and formulated in a peculiar fashion." While acknowledging that some such
original oracular forms are still recognizable in the prophetic books, Lindblom clarifies that
"the prophets also used the oracle form for utterances which were not oracles in the strict
sense." In fact, Lindblom believes that the writings as we now have them offer evidence
that "the old oracle form disintegrated and that the utterances of the later prophets are
mostly pseudo-oracles" that can be very different in content from the original form. ls
When Ryken mentions eight-"oracle of judgment, oracle of salvation, wisdom saying,
'woe' statement, report of visions, kingdom oracle, hymn, and lament" -he cautiously calls
them "subgenres" and points out that they define content but not "superstructure."19
The third problem to this form-critical solution to generic identification of the prophetic books is crucial in implication: Is there a characteristic order, or a variety of orders, that
can be determined for the oracles as collected in the different books? And what is the literary justification for and method of achieving this order? The form critic would answer this
question by focusing on the formulaic connections or linguistic signs, such as a change in
person or verb tense, that signal the beginning or ending of a separate oracle, and would
interpret "order" as rudimentary efforts to make the passages easier to read. 20 But ease of
reading is not literary order, nor can analysis of these formulaic "hinges" that join separate
oracles bestow literary unity. This claim holds true even if "each [Jinked] oracle is related
to a specific event" and "located in its original cultural milieu." As we shall see, the literary
unity of a prophetic book must be discerned in the book's total canonical form, a form
achieved by continued revision and addition through time.2I Only in this form, the
Scripture that subordinates original historical forms to theological, holistic interpretation,
can the question of literary unity be addressed. 22

II.

PARTIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM

Confronting these difficulties, critics have suggested various choices of literary types
that might serve as an inclusive term for these books. Can we not say that a prophetic
book is a proclamation or sermon? According to Lindblom, "[Tlhe bulk of the utterances
reproduced in the prophetic books were really delivered as public speeches or sermons."23
And these designations hold, even if the eighth through the sixth century prophets do
not, for the most part, deliver their messages in the formal context of worship ceremonies
or as a recognized religious duty.24 However, both historical knowledge and the texts of
the books as we have them urge us toward more precise formulations. We are fairly certain that no prophetic book is an original and exclusive collection of the proclamations of
a single prophet. Books such as Isaiah and Zechariah give evidence that later anonymous
authors or editors have contributed to the final written form of the book. Two distinct
forms of the book of Jeremiah exist, one in the Greek and one in the Masoretic tradition.
Research is making increasingly clear that each of these books is a conscious literary creation with its unique structure and cumulative authorial intentions.25
Other analyses of prophecy successfully assign a literary mode or style to a particular
book. Thus Ryken analyzes both the book of Amos and that of Jonah as satire,26 and
Thomas Jemielity has written a book entitled Satire and the Hebrew Prophets.27 Obviously,
these designations are not intended as efforts to arrive at some common genre for the
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prophetic books as a whole but to offer evidence that these writings offer rich possibilities
for literary interpretation. In fact, the short book of Hosea can be variously described as
the narrative of the marriage of Hosea, the drama of his and Comer's relationship, the
diatribe pronounced against Comer (and Israel), the irony of a woman immoral in some
fashion being selected by God as a prophet's wife, the tragedy of Israel's departure from
Jehovah, and the symbol of Hosea's love for Comer as representing Cod's enduring love
for Israel. But, if all of these designations were assigned, the question remains: How do
these specific styles blend together into one unified composition? Or do they?

m. Focus ON A PARTICULAR SOLUTION
To my thinking. the richest and most exciting possibility in the search for a definitive
literary genre that might encompass and specify the prophetic writings as a group begins
with Ryken's term "visionary literature" or "visionary writing." Ryken uses the term as a
chapter heading in his handbook published in 1984, How to Read the Bible as Literature,
and means by it one of two "types" or general categories including all literature that,
rather than being a "replica of existing reality," is "an alternative to known reality." The
biblical literature that Ryken includes in this "type" is "represented chiefly in the related
genres of prophecy and apocalypse."28 In Words of Delight (1992), Ryken lists "visionary
writing" as a genre and includes in it prophecy and apocalypse. 29 In the remainder of this
article, I want to streamline this term to "visionary prophecy" and to limit its suggested
application to the fifteen prophetic books of the Old Testament. I will then develop the
term "visionary prophecy" by jumping off from chosen content in Ryken's chapter in How
to Read the Bible, comparing other similarly focused critical thinking on this problem, and
instancing the book of Hosea, which I have already referred to above, as an example of
my application. To pursue this task, I will consider the following elements as they build literary unity in a prophetic book such as Hosea: origin, source, purpose, surface structure,
use of figural language, and the relationship of this language to a deeper thematic structure that undergirds the surface of the text. Although my conclusions are of necessity
focused here on the book of Hosea, implicit in my argument is the belief that my analyses
can work toward the discovery of similar unified structures in the other prophetic books,
thus allowing the generic term "visionary prophecy" to encompass them as well.
IV. ORIGIN
While, as we have seen, descriptions of kinds of oracles fall short of arriving at a holistic
definition of genre, recourse to the term oracle-which has the primary meaning of "the
response of a god to a question asked him by a worshiper"- situates the writings in the
origins of their own time and place. Nearly all pagan oracular literature in the ancient
world was Creek, although Rome had its smaller national collection.30 In this tradition, the
oracle supposedly comes from persons directly inspired or spoken to by a god, or by assistants who interpret the original message so that the supplicant can understand it.3] For our
purposes, we can note the following about this pagan tradition. (I) The questions asked
pertain to the future and have an individual connection to the supplicant. (2) The person
directly inspired by the god speaks in some degree of ecstasy, of frenzied or mantic articulation, an utterance that must often be rendered understandable by an assistant. 32 (3) The
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activity and its written results occur primarily in times of national stress, such as the Creek
Peloponnesian War and the Roman Civil Wars.33 (4) The supplicant is often expected to
respond to the delivered oracle by making a sacrifice or founding a religious cult. H (5) The
god's response can be symbolic as well as verbal, such as sounds or sights in nature or the
actions of uninvolved persons. 35
Studies, including anthropological research, of prophetic phenomena in ancient Near
Eastem regions such as Egypt, Mesopotamia, and Canaan indicate the activities of persons
claiming to be in direct contact with the divine. Such prophets may appear on the edges
of a society and advocate change, or they may operate within established religious or
social structures. Typically organizing themselves into diverse groups, some prophets
undergo ecstatic experiences and some do not. All, however, are expected to exhibit certain stereotypical characteristics that mark them as prophets and insure their acceptance
as such by a given social group.36
The exact nature of prophecy in early Israel remains more a matter of questions than
of clear answers. The two major questions are those of the continuity of the early
prophets with the writing prophets and the complexity of coordinating the information
on prophets of the early period from the various Old Testament books.3? Research has,
however, established certain general descriptions of such prophetic activity. Samuel, a
judge and priest in the established religious orders, also functions as a prophet. He is
involved in various prophetic actions in regard to the selection and establishment of Saul
and David as kings, thus playing crucial and positive roles in the establishment of the
monarchy (( Sam, chapters 9-16 and 28). When Saul exhibits the prophetic trait of ecstatic behavior, however, Old Testament accounts vary in expressing approval (( Sam I 0-1 I)
and disapproval (( Sam 19:9-24) of his activities. 38 The two prophets Nathan (II Sam 7: 117) and Cad (I Sam 22:5) are presented as being in alliance with King David. Nathan
does denounce David for his adultery with Bathsheba (I( Sam 12: 1-14) but helps to
arrange the accession of Solomon (( Kngs 1:8-53).39 Ahijah of Shiloh, as late as the reign
of jeroboam, functions as a prophet in allowing the division of the kingdom and upholding jeroboam's rule of the Northern Kingdom (( Kngs II: 29-39). By the period of time
described in the Elijah and Elisha stories, such prophetic figures may no longer be allied
with royal establishments but instead have become spokesmen against what they conceive to be apostate regimes. Ahijah (( Kngs 14: 1-18), jehu (I Kngs 16: 1- 4), Micaiah ((
Kngs 22), and various bands of prophets deliver messages that are in opposition to the
social and religious status quo. Some bands of prophets are disciples or assistants of Elijah
and Elisha (2 Kngs 2:3, 5, 7, 15-16) and may have been responsible for preserving the
records of the prophetic tradition in Israel. 4o
This complex picture can yield the following conclusions regarding prophecy in
early Israel. The prophets' messages are based on their concepts of Israel's covenant traditions and their understandings of the people's response to these traditions. The
prophets' function is to communicate between the people and Cod. Some are related
to a cult and some operate as individuals. Some demonstrate ecstatic behavior, while
others do not. And the prophet's role increasingly becomes that of a reformer as the
kings and priests of Israel, and then judah, lead their subjects toward conditions that
result in captivity by foreign nations:'
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By the time of Israel's writing prophets of the eighth through the sixth centuries-from
Amos to Malachi-ties with particular situations are looser or broken, and the prophet has
become the unique spokesman of Cod's message, addressed not only to apostate kings
and false religious leaders but to all the sinful citizens. And the prophets' only prophetic
actions are a symbolic acting out of the content of the divine word delivered to them. 42
Furthermore, both the prophetic words and actions become more of a forth-telling than a
foretelling. But these prophetic events, like their pagan counterparts, occur during periods
of national stress, beginning during the dissolution of the Northern Kingdom, continuing
during the fall of Judah, and extending into the periods of exile. What we shall see as we
continue to search for a genre for the prophetic writings is that certain preternatural elements of the pagan writings are transformed in the Jewish historical crisis into Cod's divinatory inspiration of the prophets. Thus Israel's prophetic writings prefigure and move
toward the apocalyptic, a type of writing that occurs between the second century B.CE.
and the second century C E. and that exhibits even more divinatory traits, such as an
increased reliance on trance-like experiences, an emphasis on eschatology, and the use of
numerical symbolism and esoteric language. 43

V.

SOURCE

When Ryken states that visionary literature often deals with things "not in empirical
reality" but as they exist in the imagination of the writer (VL 165)/4 he situates the definitive source of such writing in the imaginative consciousness of the writer rather than in
realistic apprehension of the outward world. To accept the claim of the prophetic writings
that the original source of their language is a unique inspiration of Cod's Spirit does not
negate the fact that the imagination of the writer remains the human source. The inspiration occurs, by whatever method of divine impetus, within the human consciousness.
And this consciousness is, in a literary sense, Romantic in that perception of reality is
forcefully shaped by the imagination of the writer. In fact, it is precisely this imaginative
locus that allows the radical shifting in space and time that precludes any attempt at a
conventional definition of setting in the writings. Ryken describes these radical shifts as
"reversals and transformations" that portray reality other than as presently perceived. Thus
the prophet's vision reconstructs ordinary reality, merging the present almost indiscriminately with the future, either near or distant (VL 166-67) and with earthly and cosmic
space far beyond the prophet's present experience (Vl 167-68).
VI. PuRPOSE
By focusing specifically at this point on the book of Hosea as an instance of the
prophetic books, we can note that about 760 B.CE. Hosea begins his ministry to Israel, the
Northern Kingdom, during the reign of Jeroboam II (Hos I : I and 2 Kngs 15: I). The
prophet's imaginative perception of life in Israel is radically different from the view of the
ordinary, even religious, citizen. Life at this time seems generally productive and peaceful
in the land, but Hosea perceives the nation as morally and spiritually bankrupt and creates
language that both reverses and transforms the nation's present condition. In reversal,
Israel has already come under judgment; in transformation, the nation has moved beyond
judgment to restoration. The prophet's descriptions are those of a seer whose vision
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moves at will through time and space. The following passages from Hosea reveal this
visionary movement as encompassing Israel's judgment and restoration not only with
future historical time but also with eternal, cosmic realms of time and space:
Samaria [the Northern kingdom, IsraelJ shall bear her guilt, because she has rebelled
against her God; they shall fall by the sword, their little ones shall be dashed in
pieces, and their pregnant women ripped open. (13 : I 6) Israel . . . shall blossom like
the lily... . They shall again live beneath my shadow, they shall flourish as a garden
.... What more has Ephraim to do with idols? It is I who answer and look after
you (14:5-8). Shall I ransom them from the power of Sheol? Shall I redeem them
from Death? 0 Death, where are your plagues? 0 Sheol, where is your destruction? (13 :14)
Within the boundaries of a Jewish reading of this passage, the phrase denoting redemption from death can easily be read metaphorically- since the entire book is replete with figural language-as a reference to some kind of future historical restoration of Israel as the
nation of God. Thus the language could be thought to refer to either of two versions of
modem Jewish messianism described by David Novak as "apocalyptic messianism" and
"historical messianism." The first term denotes a Jewish nation forged by a powerful ruler
who gathers the exiles back to the land of Israel, establishes a government based on the
Torah, and rebuilds the temple. The second term describes a process not brought about by
human resources within history but by divine action at the end of history. Present-day
adherents to the first version find such processes underway in the establishment of the
state of Israel in the twentieth century. Those of the second wait still for the earthly reign of
a transcendent Messiah at the end of history.45 The first version pushes Hosea's prophecy
into twentieth-century history; the second pushes it into eternal, cosmic realms.
But a Christian reading of these Old Testament passages can also function as a foregrounding to substantiate the literary claim that the last passage does indeed stretch the
prophet's imagined conditions of God's people into etemal, cosmic realms. Paul, in his
treatise on the Christian resurrection in the book of First Corinthians, quotes the passage- in a slightly modified form- as referring to the post-historical resurrection of
Christians (both Jewish and Gentile) as the people of God (15 :55) . In this reading,
Hosea's writings become a prophetic rejoicing in God's counter forces of "plagues" and
"destruction" against death.
To make this allowance is not to suggest that the eighth-century Jewish prophet Hosea,
who addresses "real people in a given period of history,"46 has a New Testament theological understanding of the Christian resurrection. But it is to claim that the message of hope
in verses such as 14 :5-8 and 13:4 exists in a text that has its origin in the visionary imagination of an Old Testament seer/ prophet, and that this message is interpreted centuries
later by a New Testament Jewish Christian as referring to a post-historical resurrection of
God's people based on the resurrection of Jesus. The question here is what James Sanders
refers to as the "task" of "establishing a canonically permissible range of resignification. As .
. . texts journey through the Bible from inception through the last books of the New
Testament, they become resignified to some extent. The .. . question has to do with the
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limits to which the readjustments in meaning canonically may gO."47 Hosea's visionary language is not necessarily limited in its reference to Hosea's era but may become by divine
ordering a sacred word that, as Childs insists, continues to "offer judgment and hope to
future generations far beyond the temporal confines of Hosea himself."48

YD.

SURFACE STRUClURE OR STYLE OF THE TExT

When Ryken claims that biblical visionary literature is a "subversive form," he explains
what he intends by the adjective:
Visionary writing attacks our ingrained patterns of deep-level thought . . . to convince us ... that there is something drastically wrong with the status quo. Visionary
literature is a revolutionary genre. It announces an end to the way things are and
opens up alternate possibilities. (VL 169, 175)
Ryken is referring not only to the surrealistic descriptions of apocalypse (Vl 169) but also
to the jolting style of the prophetic writings, a style that is both compelling and disruptive as
it shocks readers into realizing that the language they are reading does not mirror the ordinary world in a familiar way (VL 170). To explore this idea is to realize that the subversive
use of language is often visionary in style and is nearly always associated with some degree
of incitement to revolution. Thus the British Romantic poets follow the French Rousseau in
writing highly imaginative literature (think of William Blake) that not only supports political
and social revolution but also advocates a radical upheaval in the established literary theory
and practice of the day. Even earlier the Italian Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) describes in
his primitive Sdenza Nuova humans who use visionary and mythical language as a verbal
weapon to seize power from whatever generation has preceded them. 49
The prophet Hosea is involved in revolution, but it is a counter-revolution. In the
"indictment" that the Lord has against Israel (4: I and 12:2), Hosea is on God's side-the
original and rightful ruler of the nation- and thus in active process of undermining its present misguided leadership. The sinful revolution of the people against God's governance
and God's choosing of Hosea as his spokesperson push the prophet to use the language
of subversion to incite a new revolution against the present order of things. This use of
disruptive language is apparent in a passage beginning with verse four of chapter thirteen
and continuing through verse eight:
... [ have been the Lord your God ever since the land of Egypt; you know no god
but me, and besides me there is no savior (4). It was I who fed you in the wilderness, in the land of drought (5). When I fed them, they were satisfied ... and their
heart was proud; therefore they forgot me (6). So [ will become like a lion to them,
like a leopard I will lurk beside the way (7). I will fall upon them like a bear robbed
of her cubs, and will tear open the covering of their heart; there I will devour them
like a lion, as a wild animal would mangle them (8).
To attempt to read these verses as a continuum or a unit is to encounter an unexplained
dissimilarity that jars both the reader's expected continuity of logic and his literary sensibil-
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ity. Herbert Marks likens the "persistence of [such) discordant features" to the "superimposed figures of paleolithic cave art."so Struggling to respond, the reader is forced to an
uncomfortable alertness by being dislodged from familiar expectations of what reading
language, even poetry, is supposed to be like. Verses four and five seem to be a common
recitation of Cod's mighty deeds on Israel's behalf- brought out of Egypt and cared for in
the wildemess. But in verse six the state of blessedness and dependency tums abruptly
and without explanation into the contrary condition of a satisfaction that has forgotten its
source, given way to self sufficiency and pride, and forgotten its need of the wildemess
Benefactor. In verses seven and eight that Benefactor tums against the wildemess dwellers
and becomes a lion or leopard who tears and devours them. Most absent from the
rhetoric of the passage are conjunctive, explanatory aids to cognitive progress through the
verses. The writer seems angry and punishes his readers by throwing language at them.
The imagery is no help but instead counterproductive to efforts to assimilate the intent of
the language. The lion here is a devourer, but several verses earlier, in the eleventh chapter, the Benefactor/ Cod roars like a lion and the people experience a new exodus from
enemy territory (Assyria) and are placed safely in their houses (II: I 0-1 I). Ryken
describes such disturbing language as having a "kaleidoscopic structure" and remarks on
the difficulty of any reader following its "shifting" and "diverse" content without being
forcibly brought into new ways of thought and response NL 170).
This cancellation of expected continuity can be described, then, as a deliberate linguistic strategy to carry out the prophet's subversive purpose of calling the audience away
from their revolution against their Benefactor/ Cod and into a counter-revolution of
responding with repentance to his offers of mercy and restorationSI Furthermore, this jarring surface structure is common rather than exceptional not only in the book of Hosea
but also elsewhere in the prophetic writings S2 Our best response to the writings as literature may be to heed Ryken's injunction not to look "for the smooth flow of narrative" but to
"be prepared for a disjointed series of diverse, selfcontained units." Ryken is surely right when he
agrees with numerous other critics that this "disjointed method" is exactly what "makes
such literature initially resistant to a literary approach" NL 170).
Having. in the preceding paragraph, labeled this disjunctive style as a "deliberate linguistic strategy," I must face the question as to whose strategy it is. Is the prophet Hosea- or his
scribes- responsible for the discontinuous juxtaposition of verses of judgment with verses of
forgiveness and restoration 7 If so, is the juxtaposition present from the beginning of the
book's composition or does the prophet add the verses of hope after he thinks the judgment is past, such as the period after the Syro-Ephraimite war in 735-732 when Israel is
subjected to Assyria but still continues to exist as a puppet nation? Or is the discontinuity
the result of later tradents altering the text to suit it to different historical situations, such as
the position of Judah after Israel's definitive fall in 722 but before that of Judah in 857?
A comparison between two redactional analyses of the first three chapters of Hosea can
shed light on this question. Clements and Childs both find evidence in the numerous references here to the Southem Kingdom of Judah that the entire book has been edited by
tradents a generation after its original composition, perhaps during the last twenty years of
the eighth century B.C.E., to confront Judah with the impending judgment of God after
Israel has already fallen. Both critics find particular evidence of such editing in the first three
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chapters but disagree about what this evidence reveals about the original text of Hosea. In
these chapters, Israel consistently receives judgment while Judah remains a possible "recipient of promise."53 This pattern is evident in verse six of chapter one-"I will no longer have
pity on the house of Israel or forgive them"- as contrasted with verse seven- "But I will
have pity on the house of Judah, and I will save them by the Lord their Cod." Clements
reads the verses of judgment as original warnings to Israel but the verses of blessing as
redaction additions, added after the fall of Israel, that are based on the false assumption
that Judah, unlike Israel, would repent and thus avert the disaster threatened by the verses
of judgment. For Clements, then, the majority of the messages of hope are added by
tradents who are mistaken in assuming that Judah, unlike Israel, will escape the judgment
of Cod.54 Childs also reads the verses of judgment as originally written to warn Israel of
judgment but as being applicable in the historical moment of the late eighth century to
Judah, now in need of a similar repentance. He reads the verses of hope as also originally
written and, in any later revision, applicable to Judah as they have been to Israel. Thus he
views any later discordant juxtaposition of the verses as variations of a similar original jolting text that had confronted Israel with predictions of judgment or of blessing.55 Because
Childs "subordinates the editorial process" to what he sees as the canon's intrinsic intent, he
avoids the problem of mistaken tradents and reads the discordant passages as saying that
"judgment and salvation are inextricably joined in the purpose of Cod for his people," held
"together in the one divine plan." In Cod's prophetic speaking, the warning call of judgment and the merciful offer of forgiveness and restoration are always present. 56

vm. USE OF FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE
A literary approach can take full advantage of the wealth of figurative language that
makes Hosea so typical of the other prophetic books. A survey through its fourteen chapters discloses examples of the use of simile (14:5), metaphor 0:8), apostrophe (10:8),
metonymy (3:4), synecdoche (12:2), and the pathetic fallacy (3:3) . Furthermore, the
major tropes of irony and paradox function in the motif of blessing or restoration as it
connects with judgment or national doom. The two contrary experiences fuse into a paradoxical whole that resonates with the ironic necessity of blessing or salvation never taking
place until judgment has first occurred.
IX. SYMBOL AS PRiMARy FIGURE
Ryken insists that the "basic mode" of any kind of visionary literature, including
prophecy, is symbolism. "Above all, visionary literature uses the technique of symbolism.
In fact, it is symbolic through and through, a point that cannot be overstated" NL 17 1).
While few problems surface in accepting this argument as it applies to apocalyptic literature such as the Revelation, questions may arise as to Ryken's claim that symbolism is the
"basic mode" that is used "through and through" the books of prophesy. I want to
respond to this questioning not only by agreeing with Ryken that symbolism is the dominant literary figure used in the prophetic writings but also by arguing that the symbol
becomes the device that uncovers a particular thematic substructure that bestows unity
and coherence on the book of Hosea.
Exploring the symbol as trope calls first for careful definition. Bullinger names a biblical
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symbol as a "material subject substituted for a moral or spiritual truth."S? But this definition
needs refinement. By accepted literary definitions of symbol (those of Coleridge,
Baudelaire, Proust), a symbol is a word as image that refers to an entity existing within the
boundaries of the literature that, in tum, evokes meaning(s) beyond itself outside the literature. By contrast, a metaphor or simile is a word as image that, instead of referring to an
entity within the literature, refers to something outside it for the purpose of comparing
that something with an entity that does exist within the literature.
Walter Brueggemann identifies the "offering of symbols" as the subversive means by
which the prophets challenge their audience to renounce the sinful and hopeless status
quo in favor of a future of righteousness and hope.58 But Brueggemann, whose interest at
this point is in the prophetic task rather than in the specifics of the language effecting the
task, allows a symbol to be any language segment bringing to mind some particular and
positive event from Israel's past history. Thus he seems to equate "symbol" with any
graphic word picture and fails to differentiate between image, metaphor, and symboJ.59
Conversely, Ryken explains that a necessary distinction between the pictorial and the
symbolic is the difference between the pictographic and the ideographic, a difference
between images that appeal immediately to the senses and objects that trigger multiple
ideas represented by the object (VL 173), A symbol is not merely an image that paints a
verbal picture but something that suggests or implies meaning beyond itself as an entity.
Thus a symbol, which, as noted, must be situated in the literature, functions to embody
certain ideas or qualities that the figure gathers up and communicates both within and
beyond the boundaries of the text containing the symbol.
This symbolic function relates to the already described visionary movement of prophetic
literature into future historical time as well as into extraterrestrial realms. Numerous critics
note a poetic quality in the prophetic writings that we can associate with this unlimited
range of movement, both into the past and the future. Alter suggests that one effect of
poetic figures in the prophets is to "lift the utterances to a second power of signification,"
giving to particular history "an archetypal horizon." He also sees poetic figures as often
functioning to situate "historical subjects" of "here and now in cosmic perspectives."60
Bullinger emphasizes the linguistic connection of the word mystery to the word symbol. The
Scriptural word nearest to the word symbol is the word mystery, with the patristic Fathers
using the terms synonymously. Mystery means secret, and comes to mean a "secret sign or
symbol,"61with "secret" referring to the layers of expanding reference beneath the surface of
the symbolic language. Brueggemann points out that, in spite of such archetypal movement
and multiple layers of meaning, prophetic symbols are always rooted in the history of Israel
as a nation. 62 Soulen also emphasizes the situated reference of biblical figural language by
describing how the use of any such figure is invariably related to some event in Israel's history. And even when a figure moves into "world time" or into "nature" in general, the
sequence of Israel's history as a nation remains the matter at hand 6J
In Hosea the cumulative event of Hosea's marriage, alienation from, and restoration to
Gomer, along with the birth and naming of the three children, functions as a prophetic
symbol as described above. 64 The early chapters of the book relate an event that can be
read as actually occurring. The prophet obeys God's instructions to marry a woman who
is either flawed or vulnerable sexually.6s He marries Gomer and they live together in a
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marriage that results in the births of two sons and one daughter. Gomer breaks her marriage vows by becoming sexually promiscuous. The husband and wife separate from each
other. But Hosea's love for Gomer is greater than her sin. He secures her once more, and,
after a time of testing, restores her to the former marriage relationship khap[s] 1-3).
My reading of the marriage event is not intended to deny the historical critical problems of the record of the event. Childs describes the critical efforts to relate as history the
events of chapters 1-3 as being "consistently frustrated" from ever reaching any kind of
consensus as to what actually occurs or what precisely the three chapters record. 66 My
claim that the marriage event is the symbolic paradigm that orders the prophetic text is
not dependent on some ordered narrative of the historicity of the marriage as recorded in
the first three chapters but on its literary function in the book as a canonical whole.
Unpacking the sequence of the marriage event results in the following paradigm: A.
What Hosea, directed by God, does for Gomer B. What Hosea expects of Gomer C.
How Gomer responds to these expectations D. How Hosea deals with Gomer because of
her response, and E. What Hosea does for Gomer in spite of her response. Although my
observations at this point are not attempts at any formal structuralist analysis, this paradigm is similar in an elementary way to a pattern or model so described. The paradigm
indicates "the inner organization of the .. . thematic content through which the text [here,
the marriage narrative] receives its intelligibility." It describes "the constituent elements ...
and the network of relationships existing between them." Also, a structural arrangement
of the elements of the paradigm adequately controls the flow of the narrative. 67

x. DEEP STRUCTURE OF TExT INDICATED BY SYMBOL
The symbolic meaning of this paradigm, which is obvious even on the surface of the
text, transfers the narrative sequence described from Hosea and Gomer to God and
Israel. Thus we can construct the following paradigm of the meaning of the marriage narrative as a symbol of the narrative or history of God and Israel. A. What God, directed by his
own purposes, does for Israel B. What God expects of Israel C. How Israel responds to
these expectations D. How God deals with Israel because of her response and E. What
God is doing-and will do- for Israel in spite of her response.
If we agree, one, that the paradigm of the marriage narrative is competent, that is, that
it includes everything that is in the narrative and excludes what is not in the narrative,
and, two, that the symbolic meaning of the marriage narrative transfers into the related
inclusive paradigm describing God and Israel, then we can say that the narrative of the
marriage becomes a prophetic symbol that orders the apparently disjunctive segments of
the text of Hosea. Every verse in the book, either as a single entity or in group format, can
be outlined under the five headings of the inclusive paradigm derived from the symbolic
paradigm of the marriage narrative. In fact, even the verses that relate the marriage event
can be subsumed under the inclusive paradigm that structures God's dealings with Israel.
The arrangement is neither arbitrary nor forced but seems to account competently for the
occurrence of all the verses in the fourteen chapters of the book.
This sequence of five actions, each initiated by God and each enacted in relation to
Israel, is, of course, the "story" or narrative that orders in a profuse generality the content
of the entire Old Testament in all its varied literary forms. In a prophetic book, this con-
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trolling "story" is condensed and pushed beneath the disruptive surface text, a surface
where rearrangement of the verses into the five-point sequence can reveal the book's hidden thematic cohesiveness and unity. Thus, in Hosea, the five-point paradigm of the narrative of the marriage becomes a prophetic symbol, a figural microcosm of the macrocosmic content of the complete book, welding together not only the disjunctive segments of
the individual verses but also fusing form and content into a single whole. 68
Child's analysis of the marriage narrative as its stylistic mode and thematic functioning
may have changed through the stages of the book's composition lends weight to the symbol's structural prominence in the text. Originally, Hosea's sign-acts that constitute the marriage event are an "attack upon Israel's syncretistic religious worship which had transformed
the worship of Yahweh into a fertility cult."69 Israel has adopted the Canaanite mythological
belief that deity and the land exist in a "symbiotic" relationship with each other. Worship of
this deity is enacted by the cultic practice of marriageable virgins temporarily acting as temple prostitutes and offering payments for such acts to the deity of fertility, behavior which
Hosea boldly denounces as a betrayal of religious loyalty which is idolatry. The Israelites
have subscribed to a cultic myth that has involved them in sexual immorality, and Hosea's
actions and words are an accusation within that mythological construct.'°
In the later editing of the original text where its message is extended to Judah, Childs
sees mythological language becoming purely metaphorical. The people of Judah as a
whole are not engaged in idolatrous acts of sacred marriage with the mythological Baal, as
their Israelite kinsmen had been earlier in the century. Rather the Southem Kingdom has
polluted its worship by a general breaking of the commandments of Yahweh that ignores
his covenant with the nation?! The present shape of the first three chapters gives evidence that the historical sign-acts have been changed into overt metaphor. Chapters one
and three cannot be read sequentially as an integrated narrative. These chapters are separated by chapter two, which relates no action but functions only as a metaphorical
description of actions referred to in chapters one and two. Childs reads these three chapters as a later redaction than whatever editing had occurred in chapters 4-14. The initial
chapters provide an "exegetical key" that unlocks interpretation of the sign-acts as a
metaphor that continues to speak as Scripture to generations that follow late eighth-century Judah. 72 By my definitions, this metaphor has become in the present text of Hosea an
example of the uniquely complex, multi-level symbol that I am suggesting is endemic to
the prophetic writings.
The question now arises as to how this prophetic symbol moves beyond the boundaries of Hosea as an isolated text. That is, how does the marriage narrative as symbol possess multiple layers of meaning, depict visionary movement, connect linguistically with
whatever the word mystery signifies, and yet remain rooted in Israel's history as a nation?
The names of Comer's three children add these visionary characteristics to the narrative,
thus qualifying it fully as a prophetic symbol. Each name, in its initial function within the
boundaries of the narrative of the marriage, signifies the unfaithfulness of Comer to her
husband Hosea and his rejection of his adulterous wife, and, if not all of the children, at
least the last two. The Hebrew text of the book Hosea is not clear as to whether the children belong to Hosea,73 but very clearly states that Comer has broken her marriage vows,
has "played the whore" and "acted shamefully" in going after her "lovers" (Hos 2:5). Also
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clear is Hosea's initial rejection at some point in the marriage of Gomer and, in some
degree, of the children (Hos 2:3-4).
The meanings of the children's names as assigned by God signify these narrative developments of betrayal, rejection, and judgment, but apply their linguistic weight, not to
Hosea's marriage, but to Israel's covenantal history. God's pronouncement of the first
son's name, Jezreel, connects with the incomplete obedience of Israel's king Jehu and
God's warning that after four generations Jehu's descendants will be cut off. The name
Jezreel also links with the unfaithfulness of Israel to God's decrees through many generations, as epitomized in the long history of national violence that has occurred in the geographical site called the Valley of Jezreel. In this valley, Jehu seizes with betrayal and murder the throne from Ahab's descendants and inaugurates the dynasty of Jeroboam II ([[
Kngs 10), the king to whose rule Hosea is prophesying an end. Thus the name becomes a
cumulative symbol of a definitive, imminent onset of judgment on the nation of Israel?4
The names of the daughter and the last son signify God's rejection of his covenant people. The name Loruhamah means "unpitied" or "no more mercy," and Loammi means
"you are not my people." These names indicate the removal of God's love from Israel and
the nullification of his covenant relationship with them. 75
But Hosea and Gomer's marriage story does not end here. Hosea finds Gomer and
secures her again as his chastised but restored wife. And the children's names as recorded
in the passages relating this final development in the marriage change their signifying. The
name Jezreel, previously signifying the bloody valley, appears in a passage describing the
sowing of seeds and an earth bearing grain, wine, and oil (Hos 2: 22-23). A play on
words in a comparison of the two appearances of the name "Jezreel" is that in the initial
context, which links the name with the bloody valley, "Jezreel" can be translated as "God
scatters." This translation logically implies the act of "scattering" as part of the destruction
of judgment. In the second context, which describes a fertile land and its products, the
translation becomes "God sows," with the verb "sows" being a Hebrew variant of "scatters" in the word "Jezreel."76 In further changed signifying, the name Loruhamah, meaning
"not pitied," loses its prefIX meaning "not" to become "Ruhamah" or "having obtained
pity," and the name Loammi, meaning "not my people" is reconstituted as "Ammi" or
"my people" (Hos 2: I). The reversal of these two names indicates a restoration of God's
covenant relation with Israel. 77
Functioning as part of the prophetic symbol that is the narrative in which they appear,
the children's names escape the particular record of the marriage narrative and expand in
symbolic representation to indicate the central message of the text of Hosea as a whole.
Because of Israel's unfaithfulness, God rejects her as his covenant people, but, because of
his great love and mercy, he is bringing the nation through judgment to a state of restoration with himself. A passage such as the following refers not to Hosea and Gomer but to
God and Israel :
And I will take you for my wife forever; I will take you for my wife in righteousness
and in justice, in steadfast love, and in mercy.... On that day I will answer, says the
Lord, I will answer the heavens and they shall answer the earth; and the earth shall
answer the grain, the wine, and the oil, and they shall answer Jezreel; and I will sow
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him for myself in the land. And I will have pity on Loruhamah, and I will say to
Loammi, 'You are my people'; and he shall say, 'You are my God.' (Hos 2: 19,21 -23)
Thus restored, Israel becomes faithful in her covenant with God: she says, ".. . [w]hat
have I to do with idols?" She has leamed that only from her Benefactor/ God is blessedness found (Hos 14:8).
Exactly when and how this national fulfillment of the domestic symbol takes place is a
matter of much debate among different religious groups as well as among various theological divisions in those groups. But as description of the fulfillment of Hosea's multi-layered
symbol, the quoted passage is in exact accord with what we can call other E verses (the passages of promised blessing that are discordantly juxtaposed with passages of judgment) in
the double layers of the textual structure of the book. And in the privilege of visionary
prophecy, the astonishing "reversal and transformation" N. L.166) simply takes place with
no apparent concem to offer definitive historical interpretation for either early or subsequent
readers. God's never-ending search for his people that results in their repentance and return
to him is described but not historically outlined (Hos 6: I and 8:2). As Brueggemann insists,
the emphasis in what I am categorizing as the E verses is not on how or when Israel is
restored but on the "gracious gifts" of the mighty God who is the restorer. 78
A Christian reading, then, is not the only way that this symbol can move beyond the
boundaries of Hosea as a single book situated in the group of the Old Testament
prophetic writings. Jewish readings can find Hosea's promises applicable to God's judgment and subsequent blessings to the Jewish people throughout history. All modem
Messianic Jewish writing is, of course, dominated by the twin events of the Holocaust and
the establishment of the modem state of Israel. In describing different versions of both the
despair (over the Holocaust) and hope (over the established nation), Novak concludes
that "the God who saved us [the Jewish people] from Hitler and who gave us the State of
Israel is neither a God whose covenant has been falsified nor a God whose final and
unique messianic victory has yet come. 79
But a Christian reading of this symbol is also longstanding and can offer an alternate
description of the symbol's reaching into the future. The New Testament has been the
primary interpreter of the Old for the church through two thousand years of history. The
apostles Paul, Peter, and John read Hosea's symbol as stretching beyond the repentance
and restoration of the Jews as an ethnic people to include the gathering of the church as
the new Israel by Jesus as the Jewish Messiah, that is, a gathering of persons from all
nations of the earth to Israel's God in repentance and faith. Paul's argument in the ninth
chapter of Romans is that God's promises of mercy in the Old Testament are not only for
the "children of the flesh," that is, the Jewish people, but also for the "children of the
promise," who, in Paul's first century terminology, are the Gentiles. To support his argument, Paul refers to the prophetic symbol in Hosea:
As indeed he [God] says in Hosea, 'Those who were not my people I will call "my
people," and her who was not beloved I will call "beloved.'" And in the very place
where it was said to them, "You are not my people," there they shall be called children of the living God.'" (Rom 9:25-26)
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In his first epistle, Peter addresses all of God's New Testament people who comprise the
church-Jews and Gentiles alike-as Cod's "chosen race," his "royal priesthood," his "holy
nation." This nation to whom Peter is writing are they which once "were not a people,
but are now the people of Cod: which had not received mercy, but now have received
mercy (J Pet 2 :9-10). Peter's allusion to Hosea in this passage makes possible an enlarged
understanding of a symbol that escapes the boundaries of an Old Testament book to
reverberate throughout the biblical canon.
Finally, John offers, in the twenty-first chapter of the Revelation a similar expansion of
Hosea's visionary language. The people of the new Jerusalem that John sees "coming
down out of heaven from God"-a population described in chapter seven of the
Revelation as "a great multitude that no one could count, from every nation, from all
tribes and peoples, and languages" (v. 9)- are those described by Hosea's mark of identification: " mhey will be his peoples, and God himself will be with them" (Rev 21 :2-3).
Here the prophetic symbol exhibits its visionary movement into cosmic and eternal
realms, and its close connection with the Greek word mystery already referred to as
explored by Bullinger. 80 That the chosen people of Cod are from all nations has remained
a secret to past generations, Paul says in his letter to the Ephesians. But that mystery is
now disclosed because God has "revealed to his holy apostles" that "the Gentiles have
become fellow heirs, members of the same body, and sharers [with Israetl in the promise
in Christ Jesus through the gospel" (Eph 3:5-6). In its disclosure of mystery, then, Hosea's
visionary symbol not only remains firmly rooted, as our definitions have indicated, in the
particular history of Israel but also reaches beyond the close of history.
XI. CONCLUSIONS AND PossmlUTlES
What are the implications of this literary analysis of the book of Hosea? My definitions
of the various elements (origin through figural language) derived primarily from Ryken's
descriptions of visionary literature and fitted to Hosea as characteristics of a particular
genre coined "visionary prophecy" work well. Furthermore, the reading of the marriage
narrative as a symbol for God's covenantal relationship with Israel is, in Child's canonical
reading, endemic to the text in each stage of its composition. But to designate visionary
prophecy as a genre and to apply it to the fifteen prophetic books of the Old Testament,
we must learn whether the patterns that work in the book of Hosea hold in the other
books as well. Do similar descriptions of the literary elements apply equally well to other
prophetic books? Are these other books dominated by prophetic symbols that can be
arranged into doubles of the five-point (A, B, C, 0 , E) paradigm of God's covenant behavior with Israel?S' Can the verses of another such book be contained inclusively within the
double layers of such a paradigm? Only with answers to these questions can we move
toward claims about a unified literary structure typical of the prophetic books as a group.
If further studies do yield support to such claims, we witt be able to say that a literary
approach has offered something new in Old Testament studies, a generic term that gives
stylistic dominance to a symbolic structure-instanced here in Hosea- that appears uniquely and inclusively in the books of the Hebrew prophets.
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God as symbolic. The marriage is an act intended to symbolize, 19. Tucker, from a different perspective, seems to be saying that Hosea interprets his actions as symbolic in recording them (Folm
Criticism), 66. Lindblom denies any intentionality on Hosea's part. "We must not think that the
prophet intentionally married the wanton woman to present a symbol of the relation between
Yahweh and His people. Rather this marriage revealed to him Yahweh's paradoxical love to His
apostate people and was used by him as a symbol" (Prophecy), 168-69. To make this assertion,
however, Lindblom must read the description of the bride in chapter one as "proleptic," 166. She is
not originally a "wife of whoredoms" but a sexually vulnerable woman who becomes an immoral
and unfaithful wife. Thus this critic defines the restoring and marital discipline of Gomer recorded in
chapters 2 and 3 as having occurred before what he sees as the unfaithfulness that results in the
births of the last two children. Accordingly, Lindblom differentiates between the symbolic intent of
the name of the first child and the names of the second and third. The name "Jezreel" does not
"hint at any matrimonial tragedy," while the names of the second and third indicate that Hosea
refuses to acknowledge them as his own, 165-69. In my reading, the names of all three children
symbolize not only the matrimonial tragedy but also the national tragedy of God's rejection of the
people chosen to be his peculiar nation. As for the sequence of the events of the marriage, the fact
is that Hosea's intentions through time cannot be precisely decoded from the marriage event as
recorded in the text. Hence the differing views of the critics.
65. Charles F. Fensham, "The Marriage Metaphor in Hosea for the Covenant Relationship
Between the Lord and his People," jNSL 12 (1984), 71 -2.
66. Childs, Introduction to the Old Testament, 374-75.
67. These definitions of a structuralist pattem or model are from Soulen (Handbook), 184.
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Certain characteristics of my paradigm as it functions in the text of Hosea are comparable to Vladimir
Propp's structuralist theory of Russian fairy stories. My five categories of A, B, C, 0 , and E can be
compared to Propp's "functions" or "basic units" that refer "to the significant actions which form the
narrative." See Raman Selden and Peter Widdowson, Contemporary Literary Theory (3,d ed.;
Lexington: University Press of Kentucky), 109- 10. As such, the categories exhibit an "archetypal simplicity," although they do not, as Propp's units do, consistently occur in a "logical sequence." A parallel
in my paradigm with Propp's "'spheres of action' or roles" would be the roles of the Benefactor/ God,
the People or Nation, the Spokesman or Prophet, and a general class of Attendees or Facilitators, all
of whom enable deliverance of the Word or Message, a term that can also assume the status of "ro[e"
when connected with the Wisdom of the Old Testament or the Logos of the New Testament. But
my application of the symbolic paradigm to the book of Hosea is neither as elaborate nor as limited
as a formal structuralist analysis would be, as Thiselton's comments on structuralist approaches to biblical narrative make clear. My application is inductive rather than deductive; it is formulated from an
analysis of the book of Hosea and applies only in relation to this writing. My application of the paradigm is not to the text as a system but as a "life-world," a literary rendering of particular prophetic
events in Israel's history. Thus my formulation and application of the paradigm escape the confines
and the complexities of a formal structuralist approach, an approach that Thiselton concludes has
become less than useful in biblical interpretation and is not subject to "verification." See Anthony C.
Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1992), 486-9 1. The primary purpose of my formulation of the paradigm as the deep structure of the text of Hosea is to increase
comprehension in reading the surface text. And verification rests on whether or not the verses in
their entirety fit meaningfully and appropriately under the five headings.
68.
As a symbol, the marriage narrative is different from or more than an allegory. A
Handbook to Literature (7 ed.; ed. William Harmon and C. Hugh Holman; Upper Saddle River, NJ:
Prentice Hall, 1996) distinguishes allegory from symbol by pointing out that allegory "makes a structure of ideas" its "controlling influence," 12. Sweeney, in the Glossary to his form-critical study of
the book of Isaiah, (An Introduction to Prophetic Literature), makes the same distinction. "... each detail
of the allegory recurs in the interpretation," 513 . Thus, if the marriage event were allegory, each
separate incident of the narrative would have a specific and distinct counterpart to be interpreted in
God's dealings with the nation of Israel. Interpretations that slide toward allegory appear in suggestions that Hosea's buying Gomer back from some slave market is a precise correspondence of
Christ buying sinners away from Satan's control (Fred M. Wood, Hosea: Prophet of Reconciliation,
Nashville: Convention Press), 44. But even if we allow a New Testament expansion of the narrative's symbolic meaning to be God's love and mercy embracing all the nations of people who make
up the church, this particular correspondence seems forced. Any allegorica[ interpretation calls for
specific counterparts for each detail in the narrative, such as Gomer's giving birth to exactly three
children, a number without any particular significance. [n his classic study, Figures of Speech Used in
the Bible, Bullinger allows that a "true history may be allegorized," but, if so, "[Allegory is always stated in the past tense, and never in the future. Allegory is thus distinguished from Prophecy," 749.
Sweeney, however, offers several passages treating future events from the prophetic writings as
examples of allegory, but, as explained above, examples Hosea's marriage narrative as a "symbolic
action" (An Introduction to Prophetic Literature), 19.
69. Childs, Introduction to the Old Testamen~ 378.
70.
Clements, 4 [ [ and 413; Childs, Introduction to the Old Testamen~ 378-79.
7 [ . Childs, Introduction to the Old Testamen~ 379.
72.
[bid., 381 -82.
73 . Fensham, 'The Marriage Metaphor," 73.
74.
Boo Heflin, "Hosea I - 3: Love Triumphant," SwJT 36 (J993) : 13- [4.
75.
Ibid., [4- [5.
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76.
Ibid., 13-14.
77. Ibid., I 5-16.
78. Walter Brueggemann, in his Tradition for Crisis: A Study in Hosea (Richmond: John Knox
1968), 71 -73, follows Claus Westermann in ''The Way of the Promise through the Old Testament"
in Westermann's book The Old Testament and Christian Faith (ed. Bernhard W. Anderson; New York:
Harper & Row, 1963), 200, by describing the passages that I categorize as E verses as a form consisting of oracles of promise or salvation oracles. Westermann finds the following elements as parts
of this form: announcement, portrayal, and assurance. Brueggemann adds to these parts his own
description of "covenant formula" as a distinctive element in the oracular form. Lindblom sees the
prophet's literary habit of "linking a prophecy of hope to a prophecy of judgement" as simply "an
instance of lal principle of which there are many examples in the collections" of the prophetic writings (Prophecy), 243 .
79. Novak, 14.
80.
Bullinger, Figures of Speech, 769.
81.
I am convinced from my reading so far that such symbols do dominate the other
prophetic books. For instance, in Ezekial 4: 1-6, Ezekial's lying with the brick representing Yahweh
on his right side and then with the brick representing Israel as a nation or the Suffering Servant of
Israel on his left is a symbol as related to the message of the book of Ezekial as Hosea's marriage
narrative is to that book. A vital difference is that the book of Ezekial employs numerous other such
symbols while Hosea's text is structured on the one event. All of the symbolic events found in the
Old Testament prophetic writings point unmistakably to the culmination of all prophetic symbols,
the mighty acts of the Jewish Messiah/Prophet, Jesus, during Passion week- the entry into Jerusalem,
the cleansing of the temple, the crucifixion outside the city, and the resurrection on the third day.
See N. T. Wright, Jesus and the Victory of God (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1996), for elaboration on the
multiple symbolic acts of Jesus and their connection with the symbolic acts in the Old Testament
books of prophecy.
82. An earlier version of this article was presented in the session ''The Bible as Literature" at
The Open Book and Scholarship conference held August 16-19, 2000, at Redeemer College in
Ancaster, Ontario, Canada.
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Belief in God is often characterized as antiquated and thoroughly disreputable in
the eyes of modem science and post-Enlightenment philosophy. Kai Nielsen considers rational efforts to disprove God's existence mere "mopping up operations in the
wake of the philosophical and scientific developments since the Enlightenment."I
Nielsen flatly states that
There is not the slightest reason to believe that the Christian is living according
to "the reality principle" while the non-Christian, and the secularist in particular, is deluded about man's true estate. Christianity is myth-eaten. The very
intelligibility of the key concepts of the religion is seriously in question; there is
no evidence whatsoever for the existence of God; and when we keep an
anthropological perspective in mind, we will come to recognize that the revelation and authority of Christianity are but one revelation and one authority
among thousands of conflicting revelations and authorities. Given this state of
affairs, it is the epitome of self-delusion to believe that Jesus reveals what the
true structure of reality is.z
In no uncertain terms Nielsen denies the facticity of religious truth claims, most
fundamentally the existence of God. It is of course understandable why the atheologian has focused so much effort at attacking belief in God, for such belief is the
"heart and soul of Christian belief as well of the other theistic religions. This is a sensible strategy: if. .. this belief is relevantly objectionable, he won't have to deal piecemeal with all those more specific beliefs."3 He can simply do away with them all in
one fell swoop. Nielsen's argument that there is no evidence for God's existence,
that religious pluralism poses an intractable difficulty for particular religious truth
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claims, and that theism is essentially incoherent and irremediably superstitious is obviously
designed to show that ongoing belief in such a deity is exceedingly irrational.
The typical way for a theist to respond to such atheological accusations is to construct
or at least rehearse arguments, both a priori and a posteriori, in favor of Cod's existence.
Teleological, ontological, cosmological, and moral arguments, and more besides those, are
trotted out and presented in the hopes of answering the skeptic, persuading the nearly
convinced, or at least satisfying the believer.
That approach will not be taken here. For one, such a huge task would simply be too
daunting. Each of those arguments for Cod's existence, not to mention those posed
against God's existence, represents a book in itself. Such a venture would simply take us
too far afield. How can a response be offered to Nielsen without the task becoming
unwieldy? What sorts of considerations can be offered to show that religious belief is not
irrational after all? The way it will be done here is by means of an extended comparison
between two American philosophers, one born in 1842 and now gone, the other born in
1932 and still quite alive. One was a pragmatist and radical empiricist, the other a leading
contemporary analytic philosopher and epistemologist. They both loved to climb mountains, attended Harvard, struggled with the problem of evil, and believed in God: William
James and Alvin Plantinga.
A comparison of Plantinga and James is instructive on several counts. Overlaps between
them, especially in the face of their differences of approach and conviction, can prove to
be helpful starting points in an analysis of the epistemic merits of theism. Discussing these
points of contact can also provide a general orientation to some of the prominent terms of
the debate about God's existence. An examination of their views is especially effective in
raising prior questions that often go unasked and unanswered, questions that really ought
not to be neglected given their centrality to religious conviction. This examination will primarily be a comparison, rather than a contrast, though points of difference between their
views clearly exist and will occasionally be mentioned in the context of the comparison,
especially when doing so offers a point of illumination. What is remarkable is the number
of poignant commonalities in their views, the convergence of so many of their conclusions,
often based on quite different sorts of reasons (only occasionally inconsistent ones, though).
What follows is a list of about a dozen or so of these similarities.
Both James and Plantinga were vitally concemed about the intellectual propriety and
philosophical reasonableness of theistic conviction. James counted himself among the
"crass" supematuralists, and he took seriously the charge by such eminent agnostics of his
day like Clifford and Huxley that theism and religious belief were irresponsible or even
immoral, a flouting of our epistemic duties. Louis Menand writes, "It's not exactly emphasized any longer, but one of James's original purposes in promoting pragmatism was not
to get rid of empirically unverifiable beliefs, but to make room, in a scientific world view,
for faith and Cod . .. . This was explicitly the context for the 1898 lecture."4 The 1898 lecture to which Menand refers, of course, is 'The Will to Believe," which has been
described by Richard Taylor as perhaps the most widely read defense of the rationality of
religious faith in the English language. In James's The Varieties of Religious Experience, his
concern to uphold the importance of religious belief and practice is patently obvious even
to the most casual reader.
Plantinga, similarly, has taken for one of his career goals the deployment of his work in
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defense of theism. His work on modality in the Nature of Necessity culminated in his
defense of a modal version of the ontological argument and a dismantling of the deductive version of the problem of evil; his God and Other Minds canvassed the traditional arguments for God's existence and ended with an analogical argument for theism; his Does
God Have a Nature? discussed the connections between God and various necessary truths;
and his trilogy on epistemology had for its goal all along Warranted Christian Beliel the
final installment of the series and a brilliant defense of both theism generally and robust
historical, orthodox Christianity particularly.
Both philosophers can thus be rightly characterized as concemed with religious epistemology, in two senses: epistemology as it is brought to bear on religious hypotheses both
broad and narrow. Secondly, they are also concemed with epistemology as it is shaped by
a perspective unwilling to stack the deck against theism from the outset, unwilling to presume the falsehood of theism. s Plantinga and James were theists, and thus they stand
among a crowd of prominent religious believers in the history of westem philosophy,
including Kant, Locke, Leibniz, Berkeley, Descartes, Hobbes, Augustine, Aquinas, and
Ockham, to whom the religious hypothesis has seemed to be true, and perhaps even, in
Plantinga's words, "the maximally important truth."6
Concemed with the epistemic status of religious belief, both James and Plantinga examined the evidence for its truth and rationality; and when they did so they both concluded
that the decision to accept or reject theism was not a question that could be defmitively
settled on evidential grounds. As a radical empiricist, James insisted on looking at the evidence available both for and against the religious hypothesis- and unlike Hume he didn't
confine such experiential evidence to the bare deliverances of the physical senses. Neither
theism nor atheism was presumed to have the upper hand. What James encountered from
the perspective of the "purely logical perspective" was that there was not decisive evidence
for theism. Evidence and arguments could be cited and adduced for theism, but so could
evidence and arguments on the other side. A deductive version of the problem of evil, for
instance, was mistakenly believed by James to pose intractable problems for an AnseImian
conception of God. But his mistake is reflective of the fact that James refused to ignore the
counterevidence for any proposition. When he considered the arguments both for and
against theism, he concluded that this is not a question that can be definitively settled on
evidential grounds. Important to note is that James was as skeptical of the arguments favoring atheism or agnosticism as he was skeptical of those favoring theism.
Plantinga, likewise, assessing the traditional theistic arguments early in his career, concluded that none of them is successful from a strict evidential perspective. Years later he
wrote about his earlier work:
I employed a traditional. .. standard: I took it that these arguments are successful
only if they start from propositions that compel assent from every honest and intelligent person and proceed majestically to their conclusion by way of forms of argument that can be rejected only on pain of insincerity or irrationality. Naturally
enough, I joined the contemporary chorus in holding that none of the traditional
arguments [for theism] was successfuF
Also paralleling James, Plantinga similarly found the arguments against theism equally
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unimpressive. Plantinga's powerful refutation of the deductive version of the problem of
evil has now pretty much shifted that entire discussion to probabilistic versions of the
challenge. From the perspective of the early Plantinga's internalism and classical foundationalism and of what james called the purely logical intellect, evidentialism fails to provide a decisive case for either theism or its rejection. Both philosophers would thus agree
that strict evidentialism is likely of only limited efficacy in resolving this issue.
The question of what to do in the face of indecisive evidence with respect to theism
constitutes one of the great divides among philosophers. Plantinga and james represent
one side of that divide. Confronted with Clifford's dictum that indecisive evidence for
theism means one should suspend judgment and affirm agnosticism, and to do otherwise
involves a violation of one's epistemic duties, james remained unconvinced. His famous
"will to believe" doctrine was his elaborate way to argue to the contrary: that a religious
believer is well within his rights to retain his convictions. In his lucid and tightly crafted
book on james, Hunter Brown battles fideistic and subjectivist interpretations of james by
cogently arguing that james's robust empiricism's careful attention to all features of experience imposed a number of constraints on belief formation, constraints metaphysical, noetic, evidential, factual, discursive, and theological. Brown persuasively argues that the issue
that concerned james, particularly in his will to believe doctrine, is what would constitute
intellectually responsible behavior towards certain existing beliefs, including religious ones
that, while not entirely conclusive evidentially, are nonetheless generally congruent with
those constraints. Although Brown notes that james never developed his views on classical foundationalism so technically as Plantinga, james's rejection of Clifford's dictum certainly moves in the direction of rejecting the classical picture so prominent after Descartes
and Locke. Plantinga, even more so than james, insists that theistic believers can be deontologically justified in their convictions and thus flouting no epistemic duties in the exercise of their faith. In point of fact, Plantinga thinks that this question of justification is so
easy to answer that the real essence of any theory of knowledge certainly must not rest
content with an answer to it. Likewise with questions of internal and external rationality.
This is of course part and parcel of his wholesale rejection of justification with its deontological connotatations, and rationality too, as the basis of warrant, that quality or quantity
enough of which, when conjoined with true belief, constitutes knowledge. Not only is
such justification rejected as inadequate for warrant, Plantinga argues persuasively against
the whole traditional package involving classical foundational ism, evidentialism, and internalism, opting instead for a conception of warrant involving proper function of our cognitive faculties operating in a congenial environment with its relevant parts aimed at truth.
Clifford's dictum that "it is wrong, always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything
upon insufficient evidence" is taken by Plantinga to be a stellar example of the classical
package. Plantinga says, "Here we have the combination of deontologism and evidentialism. This passage doesn't display classical foundationalism as well (it doesn't say what the
evidence must consist in), but no doubt Clifford was a classical foundationalist; at least he
thought that belief in God requires evidence."8
Plantinga notes the way james's "The Will to Believe" is almost a companion piece to
Clifford's "The Ethics of Belief," noting that a better title for james's piece would have
been "The Right to Believe." In this suggestion Plantinga may well be correct, since the
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right to believe (more specifically, the right to retain an already existing belief) seemed to
be James's main concern. In a book review in 1875 of P.c. Tait's The Unseen Universe,
James spoke of a "duty" to believe, holding that belief in a transcendent realm was something one may be duty-bound to hold if it would, for the believer, be a source of commendable action or peace of mind. It has been suggested that such duty terminology had
its origins in James's contact with the work of Charles Renouvier, to whom james
announced his indebtedness at the outset of The Will to Believe. The influence of friend
and Cambridge philosopher Chauncey Wright seems to have changed james's mind
about the propriety of duty terminology.9 After 1875, james no longer used such language: entitling the essay 'The Will to Believe" and writing in 1904 to L.T. Hobhouse that
his essay should instead have been called 'The Right to Believe" (emphasis added) .
The basic idea of the will to believe doctrine is that under certain conditions it is not
contrary to duty to retain belief in a proposition that is not certain. The requisite conditions are the proposition's being forced, live, and momentous for the believer. Plantinga
characterizes James as endorsing belief in a proposition for which one has no evidence for
it, and suggests that in this way james tried to "make room for belief in God (even if not
full Christian belief) by inserting it in the gaps of the evidence. The evidential ism and
deontologism, again, are evident."lo Although james had made some movement away
from the classical picture, he was still implicitly beholden to it, Plantinga notes. This seems
right. I am less confident in Plantinga's claim, though, that james thought no evidence was
required for the proposition in question. As will be made clearer, james- perhaps exactly
because of vestiges of allegiance to the classical picture-insisted on continuing to speak in
the evidentialist terms of his day and certainly believed that a proposition was not a living
hypothesis unless it carried a great deal of evidential support.
Plantinga notes that earlier in his own career he was somehow both accepting and
questioning what was then axiomatic: that belief in God, if it is to be rationally acceptable,
must be such that there is good evidence for it. This evidence, he notes, would be propositional evidence: evidence from other propositions you believe, and it would have to come
in the form of arguments. This claim was not itself argued for, he notes. It was just assumed
as self-evident and utterly obvious. This view is what has come to be known as evidentialism (with respect to belief in God). Plantinga further notes that he failed to ask why justification is important. Further, why would rational justification require evidence? What is the
connection between these? And if evidence is required, why would that evidence have to
take the form of arguments? "I didn't raise these questions," he says. He continues:
It wasn't, however, because their answers were well known, so that further inquiry
would be carrying coals to Newcastle. On the contrary: no one else asked or
answered these questions either; instead, people tumed directly to the arguments
for and against theistic belief, taking it utterly for granted that this was the way to
investigate its rational justification.
But then Plantinga points out the one exception, the one philosopher who refused the
fashionable answer to the 'meta-question':
The exception was William james, whose The Will to Believe' ... was widely anthol-
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ogized and took the radical line (as it was then perceived) that if religious belief is a
live option for you, and a forced option, then believing even without evidence is
excusable." II
Recall that James thought that evidential considerations for and against theism were
not decisive from the perspective of the purely logical intellect. This is instructive, because
it suggests that the perspective of the purely logical intellect is potentially truncated and
incomplete, only a partial means of recognizing life's realities. If so, then James's admission
that there is not decisive evidential support for theism from one angle may be consistent
with his also thinking that there remain other kinds of evidence for theism that can distinctly tip the scales in its favor, even if not to the degree satisfactory to the classical foundationalist. That theism is not conclusively demonstrated to be the sober truth by the evidence does not, in other words, remotely suggest that James considered theism and its
alternatives to be on an epistemic par. In fact, James did not think they were commensurate in evidential support in the least (nor does Plantinga), and this is part of the significance of what he was getting at in discussing the liveness of the theistic hypothesis.
Hunter Brown has done the philosophical community a service by highlighting some
of the heretofore neglected aspects of Jamesean liveness, not the least of which is a
strongly noetic element in the believer. A proposition, to be living, must possess for the
believer a great deal of persuasive power and intellectual plausibility. Liveness involves a
strong inclination to believe a proposition. That this inclination is threatened for lack of
conclusive evidential support has usually been interpreted to mean that alternative beliefs
make comparable claims on the subject. But for James, there is distinct imbalance
between religious options and altematives, and it is only rationality construed narrowly
and evidential considerations construed strictly that make it appear otherwise. Unlike its
alternative, live theism involves a tenacious passional need, engages one's sympathetic
nature in ways not to be found in a purely abstract analysis of theism, and generates an
invigorating disposition, intellectual openness, and what James calls the 'strenuous
mood'.12 Depending on the expansiveness of one's conception of evidence, such considerations by James mayor may not be construed as evidentialist. If all evidence, for instance,
needs to be propositional, then some of these Jamesean considerations would fall outside
the purview of evidence. But if all evidence need not be propositional in nature, and can
be essentially unanalyzable, something more immediately felt and intuitively grasped, then
such Jamesean considerations can be incorporated into an evidentialist framework more
expansive than Clifford's classical and strict evidentialism. Such expansive evidential ism
seems to accord with Pascal's notion of the heart having reasons the mind knows not of,
Emersonianism's inner light, and the biblical conception of faith as being the "substance of
things hoped for and the evidence of things not seen." Live belief, as Brown has demonstrated, arises from a complex interdependence of many influences, the neglect of which
in the development of norms for responsible intellectual conduct risks creating only a
facade of doxastic responsibility behind which subjectivity may continue to exercise a
powerful and unregulated influence. Among what is constitutive of the delicate idiosyncrasy and labyrinthine character of the intellectual life include an incalculable number of
intertwining historical, cultural, linguistic, temperamental, neurological, and volitional influ-
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ences, rendering irredeemably simplistic those appeals to evidence per se or the deliverances of a dispassionately judicial intellect.
One of James's favored descriptions of moral knowledge was a kind of discemment or
divining power, a bringing to bear of all the resources at our disposal to catch a vision of
reality and truth. James's expansive evidential ism is undoubtedly pushing in the direction
of nondiscursive, immediately experienced, intuitively grasped insight, which will no
doubt remind readers of Plantinga's Reformed epistemology. According to Plantinga, the
reason why theistic belief, to be rational, justified, and warranted, need not be evidentially
supported by other propositions is because of the possibility that it is basic, and properly
so. Basic beliefs, on a foundationalist picture, are those starting-point beliefs on the basis of
which other propositions are derived and inferred deductively, inductively, or abductively.
They are not believed on the evidential basis of other propositions; one simply sees that
they are true and accepts them. In Warrant and Proper Function, Plantinga demonstrates the
way testimony, memory, induction, and a range of other parts of our cognitive systems
function to provide us with basic beliefs. Plantinga's (and Wolterstorffs, etc.) huge contribution, of course, is the suggestion that theistic belief itself might be a properly basic belief.
If so, then to be justified it need not be grounded in evidential considerations at all, at
least classically construed. It can be justified, rational, and warranted if it is properly basic.
Plantinga's story of how theism can be properly basic hearkens back to Aquinas and
Calvin's notion that God has implanted within the human heart a capacity to know his
reality. If this faculty- the sensus divinitatus- is functioning properly, in accord with
Plantinga's theory of warrant and proper function, then someone can come to believe
(and, if God really does exist, know) that God exists, and can do so nondiscursively,
nonevidentially, and basically.
Plantinga's account of the basicality of religious belief is quite different from James's
account of the intuitive, nondiscursive belief in God's existence. However, to grasp some
of the similarities here, recall that James presupposed that to be a living proposition a
belief has to be plausible and compelling for someone. There has to be a strong inclination to believe it, even after all the evidence both for and against it has been considered; a
"pre-existing tendency to believe," as James put it. What he defended was the intellectual
right of those already with such pre-existing tendencies to believe a proposition to retain
such a belief, so long as there are no compelling arguments against it. Induction, the deliverances of memory, testimony, etc. are all such that none of them can be noncircularly
established as reliable. Yet they are all also such that we possess a strong tendency to
believe them. This would seem to make the deliverances of such cognitive faculties conform to Jamesean liveness in this regard. Those examples are strategically selected :
Properly basic beliefs bear a striking resemblance to those propositions that conform to
Jamesean liveness. If a foundationalist theory of knowledge like Plantinga's is found compelling that avoids the circularity involved in trying to evidentially support the deliverances
of induction, testimony, etc. by emphasizing proper function, then just such a theory,
when conjoined with the sensus divinitatus, can make belief in God stand among our properly basic beliefs. That is, an epistemic account has been provided and story told that
could make belief in God rational, justified, and warranted.
James's conviction that theism bears the nondiscursive mark of rationality locates him
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in the company of contemporary epistemologists such as Plantinga, Brown insists:
James bears a closer family resemblance to a number of contemporary non-fideistic
philosophers of religion than to the prudential fideists with whom he is more often
associated. There is a significant resemblance, for example, between James's position
and the positions held by some contemporary philosophers regarding epistemically
'basic' beliefs. Discussion of what constitutes a properly basic belief is extensive.
One common theme, however, as Nicholas Wolterstorff has put it, is that 'the proper way to arrive at. .. a criterion [of basicalityl is, broadly speaking, inductive'. This
way requires looking to certain existing beliefs in the process of producing a criterion of proper basicality, rather than beginning with the criteria of classical foundationalism, for example, which Plantinga, Sosa and others have shown to have serious shortcomings. Norms of basicality should be developed from 'below', as it were,
avoiding what William Alston has deplored as the 'epistemic imperialism' involved
in the indiscriminate application of certain abstract standards of basicality. Such standards, he and many others argue, prematurely exclude claims to the reasonableness
of certain widely existing beliefs, including theism, and dismiss prematurely the possibility of the proper basicality of such beliefs.']

It might be suggested that theistic belief thus construed does not involve basicality at all,
but just quick inferences based on the evidence. The suggestion goes like this: Rather than
nondiscursively, knee-jerkedly coming to believe in Cod's existence when appeared to in
certain ways, one is actually making an inference-an inference from, say, the profound
sense of the deeply rooted moral nature of the universe to the conclusion of an omnibenevolent Creator as, say, the most plausible account of such moral phenomenology.
However, both James and Plantinga wished to emphasize that the degree of assurance and
conviction that this world is theistic far surpasses the level of belief characterizing the deliverances of natural theology. Bringing the notion of insight to the fore, James wrote about
the distinctly noetic characteristics of religious experience in Varieties. Many putative religious experiences reported there are "as convincing to those who have them as any direct
sensible experience can be," and such experiences are reported in terms not just of personal edification or subjective feelings but of "genuine perceptions of truth." A widespread
claim among such reports is that the noetic element involved in such instances more closely resembles an increased breadth and depth of insight than forms of comprehension garnered through scientific inquiry, and that belief in the factuality of theism is related closely
to these "states of religious insight into depth of truth unplumbed by the discursive intellect." As an empiricist, James considered it his bounden duty not to neglect reports of such
accounts in any thoroughly empirical study of the phenomenon of religious experience.
Plantinga, similarly, contrasts the confidence and sense of certitude characteristic of religious phenomenology with the tentative, probabilistic inferences of arguments for religious truth. Plantinga has dubbed the sense of congruity or certainty, of rightness and
truth, that accompanies religious phenomenology (as well as other basic-belief providers
like memory), 'doxastic evidence' or 'impulsional evidence', showing his openness to a
more expansive evidentialism potentially in line with that of James's. Such evidence carries
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with it an assurance of conviction that exceeds what propositional evidence can provide.
Even supposing that a case can made for, say, the historicity of Christ's resurrection that
renders such a contingency more likely than not to have occurred (a case that I believe
can be made), that is not necessarily enough to generate belief (even in one who finds the
argument convincing!), and certainly not belief of sufficient strength to satisfy the requirements of knowledge. Suppose that from a tub of 1,000 balls, of which 499 are white and
50 I are black, I reach in and randomly select a ball. It is more likely, of course, that I
grabbed a black one, but that is hardly any basis for a belief to that effect of any significant
strength. Or put it this way: If the Bayesians are right that degree of belief can be measured by a willingness to bet, it would not be very rational of me to wager very much on
that ball being black. Though the proposition in question ("A black ball was selected") is
more likely than not to be true, my conviction that it is true is nowhere near the conviction characteristic of religious phenomenology: a depth of truth unplumbed by the discursive intellect. Besides, it makes perfect sense that God, if he exists, would not structure our
cognitive systems in such a way that only the most tutored evidentialists and skilled reasoners would believe in his existence on the basis of often complex philosophical argumentation. A sense of God's reality universally implanted within the human heart, making
knowledge of God available to king and peasant, educated and uneducated alike, certainly resonates more deeply with the message of God's universal love as revealed in the
Christian gospel. This account also, incidentally, makes considerable sense of the widespread belief in God's existence throughout the world and human history.'4
A few additional points of similarity between James and Plantinga deserve emphasis.
The epistemic theory being sketched here, with points of commonality between James
and Plantinga, can be characterized as a version of naturalistic epistemology. [n Warrant
and Proper Function, Plantinga talks about three senses of such epistemology, the most
stringent of which involves Quine's "transmogrification of epistemology into descriptive
psychology." Whenever epistemology accords great weight in determining normative constraints on intellectual behavior on the basis of widespread psychological phenomena, the
reminder invariably manifests: 'We're supposed to be doing epistemology, not psychology!" James was one of the first leading psychologists of course and the author of the magnum opus Principles of Psychology. He only naturally allowed his psychological interests, it
can be argued, to dictate the form of his epistemological musings. The bulk of 'The Will
to Believe" can be thought of as an elaborate parenthetical exploration of the actual psychology of human opinion and an exploration of the relations among the many influences that really do produce our creeds. The picture that emerges is one of considerable
complexity. But epistemology, contra Wittgenstein, is not the science of psychology.
Fortunately, there are weaker versions of naturalistic epistemology that do not commit
one to equating or reducing epistemology to descriptive psychology.
Both James and Plantinga expressed strong reservations about treating the religious
hypothesis like a scientific postulate. [n James this took the form of his denying that the
function or purpose of religion is to solve our intellectual problems. James did not think
the purpose of religion was to close questions, but to fire our imaginations and sustain
philosophical questions. He was opposed to all forms of clean-shaven theories that treated
questions as definitively closed. He did not consider scientific reasoning to be the most
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pristine form of reasoning to which all other forms should aspire; to the contrary, he
thought scientific reasoning was one kind among many others, and that the considerably
more fundamental method of rationality than scientific reasoning was the creative imposition of form that was as much within the artist's purview than the scientist's. James was
not a divine command theorist, for instance; most of James's moral concerns were bottom-up, less interested in moral metaphysics than moral epistemology. An ineliminable
aspect of his moral epistemology, consistent with his radical empiricism, were the actual
concrete historical processes by which we hopefully come ever closer to that maximally
inclusive moral order in which James believed. He had little patience for any top-down,
single-principled moral theory of any kind, theistic or otherwise, especially one that
claimed to give the definitive explanation of something so rich as morality. He thought
that the moral life necessarily requires not just theory but a dialectic between thought and
history, the theoretical and concrete. In speaking of a transcendent moral order, and heaven as symbolic of our deepest moral ideals, he occasionally sounded a bit like a divine
command theorist, but he was not. A large reason for this was his aversion to treating religion as a hypothetical postulate rather than a living experiential reality.
In Plantinga the analogous aversion takes the form of rejecting the practice of making
theism's epistemic status dependent on how well it functions as the best explanation of various phenomena, that is, treating the religious hypothesis as a mere scientific-like postulate.
He thinks that theism may well be a good or even the best explanation of various phenomena, morality included, but that even if it were explanatorily idle it would be no less warranted in the contingency that God exists. For again, religious belief for Plantinga is not warranted on the basis of abductive inferences. ls Such a foundation is neither necessary nor sufficient for the degree of belief religious knowledge requires. Robert Adams, too, in his latest
book on theistic ethics, also echoes scepticism conceming science-inspired epistemologies as
applied to either religion or ethics, epistemologies that outside the realm of an empirical
analysis of the physical world have not yielded nearly so much fruit as science herself.16
In Warranted Christian Belief, Plantinga distinguishes the question of the truth of the theistic hypothesis from the rationality or epistemic status of theistic belief. He calls the former the de facto question, and the latter the de jure question. One of his recurring theses is
that answering the de jure question in the negative is difficult to do without presupposing
a negative answer to the de facto question. Without assuming the falsehood of theism one
is hard-pressed to argue for the irrationality, unjustifiability, or unwarranted nature of religious belief. In contrast to his former classical foundationalist self, he has now rejected
internalism, taking the salient lesson from Gettier problems to be the inadequacy of an
internalist model of justification as constitutive of warrant (even with the benefit of various contenders for fourth conditions). His theory of knowledge is now distinctly extemalist, recognizing the connections between ontological assumptions about the way the
world is and what strikes one as rational. If God does not exist, Plantinga admits that warrant is probably not enjoyed by religious believers, as there would be no sensus divinitatus
by which theistic conviction would enjoy the status of proper basicality, no functioning
internal instigation of the Holy Spirit to seal knowledge of the distinctively Christian God
on our hearts. Plantinga also admits, in consonance with his rejection of classical foundationalism, that a story like his about justified, rational, and warranted de jure belief in God's
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existence will by no means prove universally compelling to all rational persons. There is
thus no logical guarantee to which we can be privy given our epistemological limitations
that there is the requisite commensurateness between our de jure and de faao beliefs,
between persons and world. It is just such absence of a guarantee of commensurateness
that impels a classical evidentialist like Clifford to insist that the possibility of being wrong
- even in the face of the most personally compelling phenomenological features of religious conviction- makes agnosticism the proper course. Better lose truth than risk error.
Of course James wished to ask why this Cliffordian passional decision under the guise of
a purely judicial intellect is any less a risk of error. In fact, James insisted that, if it should
tum out to be the case that it is only by an experience of the world that accords epistemological significance to distinctive experiential states that a particular commensurateness
between persons and world can be discovered, then the a priori discounting of those
states would permanently preclude its discovery. As Brown makes clear, James found
entirely dubious the propensity to beg such questions by automatically privileging conventional canons of evidentially responsible behavior without due regard for the challenge
posed to those very canons by such a recalcitrant phenomenon as live theism. For James,
whether religious phenomenology functions as evidence depends on whether there is this
commensurateness between person and world. However, the potential evidence, to be
evidence, does not require our knowing in advance that it is. To require that it did would
be to say that knowledge requires knowledge that we have knowledge, and James explicitly rejected such a formula as reflective of the sort of rationalism and absolutism against
which he valiantly labored. So for both Plantinga and James, if the world turns out to be a
certain way, something like religious phenomenology can function evidentially for us, in a
broad sense. This would raise the possibility that we can have a firm knowledge of aspects
of divine reality without our knowing that we possess such knowledge.
Supposing that one is wrong about what he thinks to be divine reality, though, is it the
case that there is nothing that could possibly undermine his conviction here and now?
This question has been posed to both James and Plantinga in different ways. Cannot
James's will to believe doctrine be used for all sorts of beliefs, without anything holding
such liberal applications of his method in check? Similarly with Plantinga; does not his
view entail that all sorts of eccentric views can be held to be properly basic? Are there no
constraints in place to preclude such wishful thinking? Here James and Plantinga each has
an effective answer, it seems to me, though their answers somewhat diverge, owing to differences in their conception of God and, to some degree, differences in what it is they are
trying to defend. But each answer is worth mentioning. First, what was James's response
to such accusations of his view lending itself to unchecked willful wishful thinking? In
James's account subjective influences do not enjoy the degree of autonomy imputed to
them by critics who saddle him with the charge of wishful thinking. James depicted subjective states as framed and limited in their influence by their interrelations within the
unity of the many elements that together constitute immediate experience, and also by
their interrelations with the many different kinds of consequences which flow from particular beliefs. Brown attacks the long-standing propensity among commentators to ignore
this complex unity of immediate experience, and neglect therefore the degree to which,
within such a position, subjective influences are integrally involved in an immediate, multi-
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dimensional concrete relationship with the world which issues in results and consequences that cannot be responsibly ignored. The related prudential complaint that James
gave primacy to personally desirable consequences in defending theistic belief fails to
grapple with what consequences were in fact held by James to flow from live theism. The
major consequence of theistic belief as James construed it is the strenuous mood, which
suffuses the moral life with the note of infinitude and mystery. Living in the strenuous
mood is to reject self-interest, identify with the disenfranchised, elevate the fervor with
which the pursuit of moral discemment is undertaken, and heighten participation in the
historical dialectic of theory and demand. The often trying, counter-cultural, and costly
features of the strenuous mood bear little resemblance to easy conformism, personal
advantage, or wishful thinking.
Plantinga in the past has had to contend with the "Creat Pumpkin Objection": If belief
in Cod can be properly basic, then so can any other belief, no matter how bizarre, including belief in the Creat Pumpkin. To which Plantinga's answer is simply that just by recognizing that some kinds of beliefs are basic does not for a moment commit one to saying
that all other kinds of belief are. Michael Martin recognizes that that objection is a nonstarter, but still thinks that Plantinga's view is radically relativistic. Plantinga dubs Martin's
criticism "Son of Creat Pumpkin": Take any possible community and any beliefs accepted
as basic in that community. The epistemologists of that community could legitimately
claim that these beliefs are rationally accepted in the basic way, on Plantinga's view,
according to Martin. But Plantinga replies by showing that the only respectable objection
requires taking both "rationally" and "legitimately" as "warrantedly." Now, does it follow
that for any proposition p, if there were a community who endorsed p, these people
would be warranted in believing that p is properly basic with respect to warrant for those
in that community? No, for suppose that Plantinga's model is true and the central claims
of Christianity are true, there really is the sensus divinitatus, and the deliverance of such a
process meets the conditions for warrant. It by no means follows that, say, the voodoo
epistemologist is also warranted in claiming that voodoo belief is properly basic with
respect to warrant. For such belief could be false or the product of all kinds of cognitive
malfunction or could lack warrant for yet some other reason. Martin's argument fails.
Plantinga applies the notion of defeaters to warrant, though, in raising a way in which a
properly basic belief can be called into question. Suppose the following scenario: I see a
person from a distance at a party whom I think is Brian, but later discover from a totally
reliable source that he was elsewhere at the time. The belief I had earlier that Brian was at
the party was a basic one, based in immediate sense perception. I did not infer that Brian
was there on the basis of having seen someone whom I thought was him. Seeing that
person was just the occasion in which I automatically formed the properly basic belief
that Brian was there. The additional information I discover later serves as a defeater for
my warranted belief that Brian was at the party. A defeater makes it the case that the
belief that until then may well be warranted can no longer be believed rationally.
Plantinga admits that theistic belief in theory might confront such a defeater, just as James
believed that the theistic hypothesis could in principle confront some intractable experiential or consequential difficulty. Plantinga examines four possibilities: projective theories of
religion, contemporary biblical criticism, pluralism and postmodemism, and the facts of
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evil. He concludes that none of these defeaters works and, as the contemporary epistemological scene stands, he agrees with Chesterton that 'The philosophical case against
theism is rather easily dealt with. There is no philosophical case against theism."I?
Before applying this set of epistemic insights and perspectives to Nielsen's challenge to
theistic belief, a brief summary is in order. Classical foundationalism, C1iffordian evidentialism, and the notion of deontological justification pose no difficulties for theistic faith:
Classical foundational ism is self-referentially refuting; C1iffordian evidentialism is as motivated by its own passional subjective commitments that involve no less a risk of error as do
Jamesean rights to believe; and countless religious believers, having weighed the evidence
both for and against he religious hypothesis, have persisted in their intuitive sense that theism is the sober truth of the matter. As Plantinga has argued, they are thus subjectively justified, and if there is some objective duty that such believers are flouting, it remains unclear
what it is. The question of rationality really comes down to the question of warrant, and
something like Plantinga's account of warrant and proper function may well constitute at
least the approximately right view of the matter. Such a theory of knowledge, on the
assumption that Cod is real and has given us a faculty to recognize that, not only makes
religious belief possible and permissible, but knowledge of Cod intended and normative.
On such a picture, belief in Cod is properly basic, and this can be construed as consonant
with evidential ism broadly construed, where religious phenomenology can be taken to be
a kind of non propositional evidence. Such evidence is not assumed to be able to meet the
standards imposed by classical foundational ism, however. But for those for whom the religious hypothesis seems to be true, even after all the evidence against it has been carefully
weighed, such ongoing religious belief retains positive epistemic status. In fact, belief produced according at least roughly to Plantinga's story would be considerably stronger than
belief produced by the deliverances of the discursive intellect applied to natural theology.
The broadly empirical theory of knowledge adhered to here can be described as markedly
extemalist, which has for one of its entailments that if Cod does not exist, the religious
believer is radically wrong. But if Cod does exist, then the religious believers who allow
such belief to shape their view of rationality and the nature of the world- including morality- are likely radically right. Theism is not, however, to be treated by believers as a tentative scientific hypothesis that commands only as much conviction in its adherents as what
can be generated by abductive inferences to the effect that theism best explains various
phenomena. The account can also be seen as a mild species of naturalistic epistemology,
but one that avoids the reductionism of stronger versions of it, and one that by according
such weight to insight and the nondiscursive intellect carves out as much epistemic space
for intuitions to satisfy practically the most ardent intuitionist. Although by this account the
religious believer can be said to have knowledge that Cod exists if Cod exists, it remains
the duty of at least a critical mass within such communities, given our current epistemic
limitations (such as our inability to know that we know Cod exists), to critically examine
potential defeaters to religious belief, and for all religious believers to examine carefully and
honestly the consequences produced by their conviction.
As to Nielsen's claim, recall his bold assertion that there is simply no evidence for
Christianity in particular or theism generally.18 Most of what needs to be said has already
been covered. For simplicity's sake, let us confine our attention to the latter claim, that
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there is no evidence at all to suggest that God exists. Nielsen insists that this is the case,
repeatedly in fact. But it should be obvious by now that the mere assertion of such a bold
claim does nothing to make it true, and next to nothing by way of dissuading thoughtful,
committed theists from retaining their faith . What does Nielsen mean by evidence? Does
he automatically preclude the potential non propositional evidence provided by
Plantinga's impulsional beliefs or James's nondiscursive deliverances? If so, why? More
specifically, why should a committed theist concur? Nielsen reminds me of those who
claim that no right-thinking persons can possibly believe in Cod anymore, when it certainly seems like there are a great number of them! What could motivate such bold claims?
Does Nielsen really think that every effort to show that Cod exists, every person for
whom the existence of Cod seems as clear as anything, every piece of religious phenomenology, every deliverance of an expansively empirical study of religious experience, cumulatively add up to absolutely no evidence at all for the truth of theism? If he does, that
strikes me as monumentally unlikely, so much so in fact that further discussion with him
on the issue would probably prove pointless. For it would seem altogether probable that
his atheological bias is radically skewing his capacity for fair-minded examination of the
evidence. And if Cod does exist, and something like Plantinga's model is essentially right,
then it is not the theist who is cognitively at fault, but rather it is one like Nielsen who is
suffering from a sort of cognitive dysfunction. Though I point that out, it is not my goal to
engage in a contentious epistemic tit-for-tat here. I would rather counsel that we proceed
in the spirit of this passage from James:
We ought. . .delicately and profoundly to respect one another's mental freedom :
then only shall we bring about the intellectual republic; then only shall we have that
spirit of inner tolerance without which all our outer tolerance is soulless, and which
is empiricism's glory; then only shall we live and let live in speculative as well as in
practical things. 19
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